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New York's Expanding Empire in Tort
Jurisdiction: Quo Vadis?
By Richard V. Carpenter*
WHEN Saul of Tarsus fell afoul of local custom in Jerusalem and
occasioned a tumult, he was seized by the authorities and was tied up
to await the customary inquisition under the lash. But when the gover-
nor discovered his prisoner was a Roman citizen, he became alarmed
since it was not legal to bind a Roman. Saul was promptly untied and
thereafter treated with respect due a citizen of the Empire. As the pro-
ceedings dragged on, Saul appealed to the emperor's court before
whom a Roman citizen ought to be tried and the governor again quickly
decided to send him to Rome for trial.1 Such were the special privileges
attendant on imperial citizenship in a relatively barbarous age. Today
the courts of New York seem determined to make the residents of their
Empire State the privileged imperial citizens of our own time where-
soever they may find themselves.
Miller v. Miller and Prior Developments
A New Yorker visited Maine for a few days and there accepted a
ride in a car registered and insured in Maine, driven by his brother
and owned by his sister-in-law, both residents of Maine. An accident
occurred within Maine boundaries and the New Yorker was killed.
Shortly thereafter the brother and sister-in-law conveniently moved to
New York where the victim's administrator brought suit against them
under the Maine statute for wrongful death.2 The issue of the case
turned on the trial court's dismissal of the defendants' partial defense-
that recovery, if any, should be limited to the $20,000 maximum pre-
scribed by Maine's wrongful death statute as it existed at the time of
the accident. In 1968 the New York Court of Appeals in its 4-3 decision
of Miller v. Miller3 held that the limitation of damages prescribed by
* Professor, Hastings College of Law
1. Acts 22:23-30, 25:10-12.
2. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 255.1 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1971).
3. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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the Maine wrongful death statute would not apply to the suit in behalf
of New York survivors for the death of a New Yorker.
This decision was a remarkable extension of the now familiar de-
cision in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.4 and Babcock v. Jackson5
in which the New York Court of Appeals had taken a lead in modifying
the erstwhile exclusive role of the place-of-wrong rule in determining
the choice of law applicable to a tort with multi-state elements. In
Kilberg the New York Court of Appeals approved of recovery under the
Massachusetts wrongful death act 6 without regard to the limitation on
the amount of recoverable damages prescribed by the act. Under the
facts of the case, however, the deceased victim, a New York resident, had
purchased his ticket and enplaned at LaGuardia Airport in New York
for a flight routed largely over New York territory but which ended
disastrously in Nantucket, Massachusetts, where it crashed, killing
everyone on board. The defendant, Northeast Airlines Company, reg-
ularly did a large part of its business in New York where the fatal flight
had originated. The Babcock decision allowed a guest auto passenger
to recover damages against the host owner and driver of the car for in-
juries suffered in an accident in Ontario. The Ontario guest statute
7
would have barred recovery, but the court stressed the facts that both par-
ties to the suit were New Yorkers, the defendant's car was registered and
insured in New York, and the host-guest relationship had begun and
was to end in New York.8
The restrictive caution with which the New York Court of Appeals
initially viewed its analysis in the Babcock case is evidenced by its deci-
sion 2 years later in Dym v. Gordon' when it refused to apply forum law
to a suit between two New Yorkers for injuries suffered in Colorado
whose guest statute 0 would have barred recovery. The court distin-
guished the case from Babcock on the grounds that the host-guest re-
lationship had not arisen in New York but was centered in Colorado
where the two New York parties were spending some months as summer
students, and that the accident involved collision with another car
occupied by non-New Yorkers who might be unable to recover fully if
the New York plaintiffs were allowed to share the maximum insurance
4. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
5. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
6. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1958), as amended (Supp. 1971).
7. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
8. 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
9. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
10. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963).
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provided by the defendant's insurance policy." The Dym decision, how-
ever, seems to have been a temporary retreat, its authority shaken by
the decision in Macey v. Rozbicki 2 only a year later and completely de-
molished by Miller'3 and subsequent cases hereinafter discussed.
The New York court has strongly influenced the modem revolu-
tionary trend in conflicts rules affecting torts. This influence has been
exerted principally through the Kilberg and Babcock decisions. Until
the Miller decision this influence has, in the opinion of the writer, been
salutary.'4  The courts of Califomia,15 Pennsylvania,' Iowa,1
7 Florida'8
and Rhode Island 9 have followed New York's lead in adopting the Kil-
berg rule, thus abandoning the place-of-wrong rule as the sole standard
for the measure of damages.2" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
also decided a diversity case initiated in Indiana on the same principles.
2 '
On the other hand Kansas,22 Oklahoma, 23 Maryland,24 Missouri,25 Ark-
ansas20 and Texas27 have continued their allegiance to the place-of-wrong
standard for measuring damages, as have federal courts28 in diversity
11. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124-25, 209 N.E.2d 792, 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463, 466-67.
12. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966). In Macey, the
plaintiff, a guest passenger, brought suit against the host driver (her sister) and the
owner of the car (her sister's husband). Although the host-guest relationship arose in
Ontario, where the accident occurred, the court pointed out that "the relationship of two
sisters living permanently in New York was not affected or changed by their temporary
meeting together in Canada for a short visit there, especially since the arrangements
for that visit had undoubtedly been made in New York State. Every fact in this case
was New York related ... ." Id. at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
13. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
14. See note 91 infra.
15. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
16. Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
17. Fabricus v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1964).
18. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
19. Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968).
20. "The measure of damages for a tort is determined by the law of the place of
wrong." RESTATMENT (FrsT) OF CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 412 (1934).
21. Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965).
22. McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965).
23. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520, 525 (Okla. 1965).
24. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
25. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965).
26. McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966).
27. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968), aff'g 416
S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
28. Under the present state of the law established by Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), a federal court may not introduce innovations in the
choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.
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cases initiated in Maine, -9 Ohio,3" Delaware 31 and North Carolina3 2 re-
spectively.
Similarly at least nine states, Wisconsin, 33 Minnesota 3 4 New Hamp-
shire,35 Kentucky, 36 Maine, 36a Missouri, 37 California, 38 Rhode Island 9
and Iowa,4° have followed New York's lead in deciding cases in accord
with the philosophy of the Babcock court while the courts of Florida,4'
Oregon" and Mississippi4 3 have strongly endorsed that philosophy. On
the other hand, the courts of four states-West Virginia,4" Delaware, 5
Maryland,4" and Michigan 47 -have continued to adhere to the place-of-
wrong rule with respect to host-guest liability. However, the West Vir-
ginia court rendered its decision in 1963 when it was apparently un-
aware of the Babcock case which had been decided shortly before. Other
state courts which have continued to abide by the place-of-wrong rule
with respect to intra-family liability would presumably also reject the
Babcock rule in respect of host-guest liability. These include the courts
of Connecticut, 48 Louisiana,49 North Carolina" and Tennessee. 5'
29. Turner v. Capitol Motors Transp. Co., 214 F. Supp. 545 (D. Me. 1963); pre-
sumably overruled by Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970).
30. Goranson v. Capitol Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
31. Culley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 244 F. Supp. 710 (D. Del. 1965).
32. Brendle v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969).
33. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Wilcox v. Wil-
cox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
34. Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Kopp v.
Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
35. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
35a. Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970).
36. Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
37. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969).
38. Fuller v. Greenup, 267 Cal. App. 2d 10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1968).
39. Brown v. Church of Holy Name, 252 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1969); Woodward v.
Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968).
40. Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968).
41. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 747 (Fla. 1967).
42. Casey v. Mason Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
43. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968). But see Browning v. Shackel-
ford, 196 So. 2d 365, 372 (Miss. 1967).
44. Thomsbury v. Thomsbury, 147 W. Va. 771, 131 S.E.2d 713 (1963).
45. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Sterling v. Carr, 213 A.2d 704
(Del. 1965).
46. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
47. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969), aff'g 11
Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968).
48. Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966).
49. Nicholson v. Atlas Assurance Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
245 La. 461, 158 So. 2d 612 (1963).
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In tort decisions involving issues other than the measure of damages
(Kilberg) and host-guest liability (Babcock), the New York courts have
also chosen to apply New York law favoring the plaintiff's recovery
rather than the more restrictive rules of the states where the various acci-
dents occurred. Such other issues have included interspousal liability,52
the liability of an owner of a car involved in an accident53 and perhaps
the immunity of charitable organizations." ' But until the Miller55 case,
every decision by the New York or any other American court applying
Kilberg or Babcock principles has been restricted to a fact situation in
which all parties to the suit have been residents of, or otherwise substan-
tially connected with, either the forum state or other states whose laws
were in accord with forum law. Not until the Miller decision do we
find any American court invoking its own forum law to impose on a
non-resident defendant harsher sanctions than would be permitted by
the law of defendant's state of residence where occurred all the events
culminating in the cause of action. The Miller decision constitutes a
sharper break with the traditional American concepts of territorial
jurisdiction than heretofore has been seen in our country.
Admittedly, certain extenuating circumstances existed in the context
of Miller which have thus far been omitted in our statement. For one
thing the defendants were natives and exresidents of New York who had
moved to Maine for business purposes just a year or so before the acci-
dent. They returned to New York and re-established their residence
there shortly after the accident.5" Also, subsequent to the accident the
Maine Legislature amended its wrongful death law by repealing the
limitation on damages, although this was not retroactive. 57 With these
facts as a backdrop, Judge Keating, speaking for the court majority, held
that New York had the predominant interest in the protection and regu-
lation of the rights of the persons involved. He reasoned that the prob-
lem involved the manner in which the family of one whose life has been
50. Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965);
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
51. Lucas v. Phillips, 205 Tenn. 444, 326 S.W.2d 905 (1957).
52. Keller v. Greyhound Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 255, 244 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
53. Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
54. See Blum v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 21 App. Div. 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d
522 (1964), in which the court said that Kilberg was not reached because the laws of
both states were the same.
55. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
56. Id. at 14, 237 N.E.2d at 878, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
57. [19651 Me. Laws, ch. 225, amending Mn. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2551
(1964).
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wrongfully taken is to be compensated for the loss which they have suf-
fered. New York has chosen to prohibit any limitation on recovery
and is vitally concerned with the manner in which the wife and children
of a New York decedent will be compensated for the economic loss they
have suffered as a result of the wrongful killing of their "bread winner."5
He rejected any countervailing claim in favor of application of Maine
law because the defendant had not relied upon it, stating:
[W]e perceive no substantial countervailing considerations of the
kind described above which would warrant the rejection of our
own law in favor of that of Maine. The Maine statute with which
we are concerned here, dealing as it does with the nature of the
remedy for concededly tortious conduct, is obviously not the kind
of statute which regulates conduct and, therefore, is not the kind of
statute upon which a person would rely in governing his conduct.
The only justifiable reliance which could be present here would in-
volve the purchase of liability insurance in light of the remedies
available to an injured person. No such reliance is claimed here.
59
Then, adverting to possible unfairness to the insurer, Judge Keating said:
With respect to the liability insurer-the real party in interest-a
somewhat different situation obtains. The insurer may have ex-
pected that Maine's limitation on death recoveries would apply to
accidents in Maine. But here in determining whether any unfair-
ness will result by virtue of the application of New York law, we
may also consider the fact that the policy in question was not and
could not have been limited to affording protection only to acci-
dents occurring in the State of Maine (Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
29, § 781 et seq.) and that, therefore, the possibility of liability in
excess of $20,000 was certainly not unexpected and was insured
against. Moreover, an analysis of the actuarial process as well as
an inquiry to the Insurance Commission of the State of Maine re-
veals that the presence of the limitations had no substantial effect
on insurance premiums, and a refusal to apply Maine law here will
have an infinitesimal effect, if that, on insurance rates in Maine. 60
The court went on to hold that the application of New York law
would not unduly interfere with a legitimate interest of Maine in regula-
ting the rights of its citizens with regard to conduct within its borders.
Thus:
58. Id. at 18, 237 N.E.2d at 880, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 739. Some support for this
paramount emphasis on the law of the state of residence of the decedent and the plain-
tiffs may be found in the literal language of Justice Traynor in his opinion in Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), but the decision of that
case is readily distinguishable on its facts from Miller. See text accompanying notes
131-132 infra.
59. 22 N.Y.2d at 19-20, 237 N.E.2d at 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
60. Id. at 21, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
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Here again we perceive no reason to deny application of our own
law. To the extent that the Maine limitation evinced a desire to
protect its residents in wrongful death actions, that purpose cannot
be defeated here since no judgment in this action will be entered
against a Maine resident. Maine would have no concern with the
nature of the recovery awarded against defendants who are no
longer residents of that State and who are, therefore, no longer
proper objects of its legislative concern. It is true that, at the time
of the accident, the defendants were residents of Maine but they
would have no vested right to the application of the law of their
former residence unless it could be demonstrated that they had gov-
erned their conduct in reliance upon it [citation omitted]-a re-
liance which is neither present nor claimed in this case. Any claim
that Maine has a paternalistic interest in protecting its residents
against liability for acts committed while they were in Maine, should
they move to another jurisdiction, is highly speculative and ignores
the fact that for the very same acts committed today Maine would
now impose the same liability as New York.61
Judge Keating's reliance on the defendants' post-accident change of
domicile suggests the astonishing notion that the jural relations between
the parties (viz., their respective rights and liabilities) will shift in
chameleon fashion as the parties may thereafter change their residence
from state to state. However, if the opinion is read as a whole it appears
likely that the post-accident events are not prerequisites to the disposition
of the case, but are expediently used for supplemental or makeweight
arguments because they were ready at hand under the unique facts of
the Miller decision. Miller is open to the construction that New York
claims the paramount interest and power to apply its law and policy
to provide full compensation ii any wrongful death case where the de-
cedent and the surviving plaintiffs are New York residents, regardless
of the place of accident or the residence of the defendant. 62 Neither the
state of defendants' residence where the accident occurred nor the de-
fendants themselves were deemed to have a sufficient countervailing
claim to the protections afforded by their state law, because the defen-
dants were insured or in any event ought to have had insurance protec-
tion. Two New York lower courts have so construed Miller despite the
absence of any of the extenuating circumstances or post-accident events
involved in those cases.6 3
61. Id. at 21-22, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741-42.
62. Compare Currie's "basic method" for choice between conflicting state inter-
ests outlined in B. Cuum, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CoNFLicrs OF LAws 177, 183-83 (1963).
63. E.g., Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969);
MacKendrick v. Newport News Ship Bldg. & D.D. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 994, 302 N.Y.S.2d
124 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
One New York trial court, however, after citing the Miller decision, completely
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New York's expanding claim to legislative jurisdiction exempli-
fied by the Miller line of cases64 may simply be an extension of its ap-
proach 2 years earlier in the Court of Appeals' extraordinary decision
in Seider v. Roth.65  The Seider decision is a story in itself. It as-
serted unprecedented judicial jurisdiction for the New York courts just
as Miller claimed unprecedented legislative jurisdiction. Under the
Seider rule the New York courts may assert quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
against any tort defendant in the world who happens to carry liability
insurance with an insurance company doing business in New York.
Since New York is a major financial and insurance center of this country,
this rule seems to expose most responsible defendants to the ubiquitous
jurisdiction of the New York courts regardless of such defendants' lack
of contact or relationship with that state. It is perhaps of more than
passing significance that the New York courts should be reaching to-
ward universal legislative jurisdiction in Miller v. Miller6 so soon after
their revolutionary grab for unparalleled judicial jurisdiction under
the Seider decision. The earlier decision may reflect the same expan-
sionist spirit in the New York Court of Appeals which later moved it
to reach its Miller decision. It is in order, therefore, to comment
further on the Seider case before completing our discussion of the cases
coming after Miller.
Seider v. Roth
Seider v. Roth67 involved an auto accident in Vermont in which a
New Yorker was injured by the negligence of a Canadian. The Canadian
carried an ordinary automobile insurance policy with the Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Company, which policy had been issued in Canada.
Hartford, of course, does business in New York. The New Yorker
filed suit in New York against the Canadian by serving him personally
disregarded its relevance to the case at hand. In Hancock v. Holland, 63 Misc. 2d 811,
313 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1970), the supreme court refused to apply New York law
to an auto accident that occurred in Georgia. The plaintiffs, both New York domicil-
iaries, were passengers in the car of the defendant, a citizen of Georgia, when the
vehicle collided with another auto, driven by a South Carolina resident. Both cars
were registered in Georgia and the defendant's car was insured there. The court
held that the Georgia guest statute was applicable because Georgia had a superior
interest in having its law applied. The court cited Miller but did not refer to its facts
or attempt to distinguish them from those of the case at bar. The decision seems
contrary to Miller and clearly conflicts with the results reached by the Tiepkema and
MacKendrick courts.
64. See cases cited at note 63 supra.
65. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
66. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
67. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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in Canada and garnisheeing the "debt" which Hartford allegedly "owed"
the insured. Hartford's debt under its policy to the insured was based
on its obligation to indemnify the insured.68  The garnisheed debt was
thus contingent upon the existence of a valid judgment against the in-
sured. At the same time, the validity of any judgment against the insured
in the New York proceeding depended upon the validity of the garnish-
ment of the debt. The court's validation of both the garnishment of the
debt and the judgment, by their interdependent effect, was a bit of leger-
demain which Judge Burke aptly characterized in his dissenting opinion
as a bootstrap operation:
The jurisdiction ... is based upon a promise which evidently
does not mature until there is jurisdiction. The existence of the
policy is used as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to start the very
action necessary to activate the insurer's obligation under the pol-
icy. In other words, the promise to defend the insured is assumed
to furnish the jurisdiction for a civil suit which must be validly com-
menced before the obligation to defend can possibly accrue. "This
is a bootstrap situation." 69
The rationale advanced in support of the decision is that it merely
converted the injured party's claim against the insurance company into a
"direct action" which result was said to be warranted by the United States
Supreme Court in deciding Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp.70  Under that decision the Supreme Court sustained a Louisiana
statute allowing a direction action against an insurer contrary to the
policy's express terms, but under the facts of that case the injury had
actually occurred in Louisiana; in contrast, New York had no connec-
tion either with the accident in Seider or with the issuance of the policy.
The Seider decision has been subjected to considerable criticism
and attack and its constitutionality has been questioned. 71 During
68. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.2d at 101.
69. Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. A peculiar circumstance
of the Seider rule is that the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify the insured is
ordinarily extinguished if the insured should refuse or unreasonably fail to cooperate in
his defense. Thus, if the defendant did so refuse or fail the plaintiff's judgment would
be a pyrrhic victory since there would be no value remaining in the garnisheed policy to
apply in payment of the judgment. However this is an unlikely eventuality. Since
non-cooperation would cause the defendant to forfeit his insurance protection for all
purposes, he is under almost compelling coercion to cooperate for his own defense.
70. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
71. E.g., Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CoNFLIcTs LAW § 45, at 91 n.5 (1968). But see Minichiello v. Rosenberg,
410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). The Seider rule has
been rejected by courts in Missouri, Rhode Island and South Carolina. State Gov't
Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1960); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 258
A.2d 464 (R.I. 1969); Howard v. Allen, 176 S.E.2d 127 (S.C. 1970).
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the following year two of the four judges who comprised the slim majority
in the decision, retired from the court. Consequently, on an appeal in
a similar case, Simpson v. Loehmann,72 the defendant asked the court
to reconsider its decision. The Court reaffirmed the Seider rule, this
time by a vote of 5-2. Judge Breitel, a new judge who later dissented
in the Miller case, agreed with the majority solely on the principled
basis of stare decisis, beginning his concurring opinion as follows:
I concur but only on constraint of Seider v. Roth [citation omitted]
so recently decided by this court. Only a major reappraisal by the
court, rather than the accident of a change in its composition, would
justify the overruling of that precedent. Yet the theoretical un-
soundness of the Seider case and the undesirable practical conse-
quences of its rule require some comment if only, perhaps, to
hasten the day of its overruling or its annulment by legislation.
It is the most tenuous of nominalist thinking that accords the
status of an asset, leviable and attachable, to a contingent liability
to defend and indemnify under a public liability insurance policy.
73
And again later in his opinion, he said:
As for the effect of the rule, the practical consequences are highly
undesirable. This State, and particularly its chief city, is the mecca
for those seeking high verdicts in personal injury cases. [Citation
omitted.] On the basis of the rule in the Seider case, it will be a
rare plaintiff who cannot invoke the jurisdiction of New York
courts, even though only quasi in rem, since it will be a very small
insurance company that does not have a palpable contact with
this state.
Judge Bergan, who had dissented in Seider,71 now lined up with
the majority by concurring in Breitel's stare decisis rationale. Thus, the
curious result is that the Seider rule is still law in New York by fiat of
the New York Court of Appeals which at least count strongly disap-
proved of the rule by 4 to 3.
Nevertheless, under compulsion of Erie v. Tompkins,75 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Seider rule in a 6 to 3 en banc
decision in the diversity case of Minichello v. Rosenberg.6 Writing for
the court, Judge Friendly predicted that the constitutionality of the
Seider rule would be upheld by the United States Supreme Court. How-
ever, to keep its application within constitutional bounds he would im-
pose two caveats or limitations: (1) it should be applied only when the
72. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967).
73. Id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
74. Id. at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
75. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
76. 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
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plaintiff is a bona fide resident of New York,77 and (2) if the insurance
proceeds should be inadequate to satisfy the plaintiffs' full claim of
damages, plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting collateral estoppel
in any subsequent proceeding.78
Miller and Subsequent Cases
The cumulative effect of the Seider and the Miller decisions was
manifested in the 1969 case of Tjepkema v. Kenny.79 This case involved
the wrongful death of a New Yorker in Missouri, allegedly due to
the negligence of defendant, a Missouri resident. The trial court struck
out the partial affirmative defense that recovery, if any, must be sub-
ject to Missouri's statutory limitation of $25,000. The Appellate Divi-
sion unanimously affirmed in a per curiam opinion. It ruled that New
York's unrestricted measure of damages must apply since the decedent
and all plaintiffs were New York residents. The defendant's residence
in Missouri, where the accident occurred, and the apparent absence of
any connection between him and the State of New York were not even
mentioned as factors for consideration by the court. Here New York's
assertion of far-reaching legislative jurisdiction is compounded by the
fact that its judicial jurisdiction over the Missouri defendant was based
solely on the quasi-in-rem attachment of his insurer's obligations under
his auto insurance policy in accord with the Seider rule.
Finally, in MacKendrick v. Newport News Shipbuilding & D. D.
Co.,8 0 an action was brought for the wrongful death of a New York resi-
dent employed by an independent contractor. Pursuant to arrange-
ments made in Pennsylvania between the decedent's employer and a
subcontractor for equipment in a Polaris submarine, the decedent went
to Virginia to do repair welding on a submarine at defendant's plant.
In the course of his work he was asphyxiated. The defendant pleaded
in part defense that recovery should be limited to $30,000 by the
Virginia Wrongful Death Act, urging that it was a Virginia corporation
77. This limitation had previously been imposed by the district court in Varady v.
Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and was subsequently applied in Farrell v.
Piedmont Aviation Co., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969).
78. This limitation is contrary to usually accepted principles governing collateral
estoppel. United States v. Balanovsky, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 968 (1957); Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Steinberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73,
191 So. 94 (1939). Even if collateral estoppel were recognized, however, it would only
apply to findings of fact. Presumably it would not impose on the second court in
another state the choice of law made by the first court in the quasi-in-rem proceedings.
79. 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969).
80. 59 Misc. 2d 994, 203 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
May 19711 1183
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
domiciled in Virginia and having no connection with the State of New
York. Judge Spiegel, sitting in the trial court, struck the defense, say-
ing:
Clearly the public policy of our courts is to protect New York
domiciliaries, wherever possible, from denial of recovery in an-
other jurisdiction. .... 81
The Miller case and the two cases following it were all wrongful
death actions involving the issue of a limitation on the amount of re-
covery imposed by the law of the states where the accidents occurred and
the defendants resided. With respect to other specific issues New York
has also chosen to apply its own rules favoring the plaintiff's recovery
rather than more restrictive rules of the states where the various acci-
dents occurred. As we have seen above, such specific issues have in-
cluded host-guest liability.8 2 They also have included interspousal lia-
bility,8 3 the liability of an owner of a car involved in an accident s4 and
perhaps the immunity of charitable organizations."i In every such case
so far, all parties to the suit were residents of New York. It seems
likely that when occasions arise the New York courts will extend the
principles of the Miller case to these other specific issues"' when the
injured plaintiffs reside in New York, without regard to the law of the
place where the injuries occur or the defendants reside.8
Constitutional Considerations
A. Due Process
When a state court is called upon to choose between conflicting
rules of two or more jurisdictions (whether or not one of those jurisdic-
tions be its own state), its power, strictly speaking, is limited only by
81. Id. at 1011, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
82. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
83. Keller v. Greyhound Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 255, 244 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
84. Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
85. Blum v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 683, 250 N.Y.S.2d
522 (1964).
86. In light of the Miller court's reliance upon the precedent of Babcock v.
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), it is clear that the
Miller rule will be applied to the issue of host-guest liability.
87. It should also be noted that in its 1962 decision in Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962), the New York Court of Ap-
peals declined to apply its own statutory rule to include in damages an item for pre-
judgment interest. It is quite possible that the New York court, in its current expan-
sionist phase, will overrule its restrictive Davenport decision when the issue next arises.
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full faith and credit and by due process, whose strictures on the choice
of conflicting laws have become very elastic under the suzerainty of
the modem Supreme Court. Nevertheless the Supreme Court continues
to indicate that there are some limits beyond which it will not permit a
state court to trespass. In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.", in 1953
Chief Justice Vinson said:
The states are free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws as they
choose,. . subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other
constitutional restrictions. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not compel a state to adopt any particular set of rules of conflict
of laws; it merely sets certain minimum requirements which each
state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state.
In the course of his opinion in Richards v. United States, 9 Chief
Justice Warren used language which may reveal the current approach
of the Supreme Court to the question. He said:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with
the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the inter-
ests possessed by the States involved, could constitutionally apply
to the decision of the case the law of one or another state having
such an interest in the multistate activity. 90
Under the broad rule enunciated in Richards, are the Miller and
Tjepkema decisions constitutional? If a citizen of State A commits
a completly local act in State A which accidentally results in physical
injury or death to a resident of State B who happened at the time to be
present in State A for some purpose of business or pleasure totally
unrelated to the accident or to the resident of State A who caused the
accident, does State B then have "sufficiently substantial" contact with
the event to impose on State A's resident a liability for his act sub-
stantially in excess of the liability which State A would permit? In the
modem trend courts have gone far to find "sufficiently substantial" con-
tacts to justify one choice of law or another in personal injury cases.91
88. 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953).
89. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
90. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
91. The present writer favors most of this modem trend. See Carpenter, New
Trends in Conflicts Rules Affecting Torts: A Chronological Review, 1 LOYOLA L.J.
187 (Chicago 1970). In some situations, however, the traditional territorial limitations
of legislative jurisdiction should be observed. Two federal cases decided in the past
six years illustrate this principle: Tramontana v. S.A. Enprese de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro, 245 F.
Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 359 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966). Both cases involved
the deaths of Americans traveling in Brazil due to the negligence of a Brazilian air-
line having no substantial connection with the United States. No questions of due
process or international law were explicitly raised but in each case the court without
hesitation limited the amount of recovery to the pitifully inadequate maximum ceiling
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However, only the New York courts have claimed that State B in the
context of our question would have such "sufficiently substantial" con-
tact to justify the imposition of its own heavy sanctions on the hapless
State A resident. The question becomes whether State B's imposi-
tion of its heavy sanctions under the circumstances would deprive the
State A resident of liberty and property without due process of law. Al-
though the United States Supreme Court has never specifically decided
this question, there still stands one bastion case which may indicate the
approach the Court will take if it is called upon to decide the issue-
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. 2
This case involved a suit in a Texas court by a permanent resident
of Texas against a Mexican insurance company on a Mexican policy in-
suring a boat in Mexican waters. The plaintiff temporarily resided in
Mexico at the time he acquired his interest in the policy and at the
time he suffered the loss of the boat. Jurisdiction was based on garnish-
ment of sums owed to the defendant under reinsurance contracts with
American insurance companies. Suit was filed more than a year after
the loss and the question at issue was whether this fact barred the ac-
tion by reason of a stipulation in the policy that suits thereunder must be
filed within 1 year. This stipulation was valid and enforceable by
Mexican law but was void by Texas statute. The Texas courts applied
their own law to disallow the defense and the question was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that to override the Mexican time limitation by application of
the Texas statute would deprive the defendant of property without due
process of law. Justice Brandeis, in the course of his opinion for the
unanimous Court, said:
[I]n the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued
on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to
be done in Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy
for damages permitted by Brazilian law. Brazil was deemed to be the jurisdiction
with the most significant relationship to the accident. But in the unlabored quickness
of the decisions may be discerned the court's implicit sense of fair play and justice.
Perhaps the New York courts would distinguish these decisions on the ground that
new factors come into play when the choice is between domestic law and that of a
foreign nation, jealous of its territorial sovereignty. Here any arbitrary application
of domestic law to a foreign occurrence, which application adversely affected the rights
of a foreign citizen, could be a cause for embarrassment to the United States Govern-
ment. The paramount interest of the Federal Government in foreign affairs therefore
does limit the freedom of a state court (or a federal court sitting as such in a diversity
case) to extend the application of its domestic law under such circumstances. However,
the difference, if any, between such a situation and a conflict between two of our own
"sovereign" states is only one of degree.
92. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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were done in Mexico. All in relation to the making of the contracts
of re-insurance were done there or in New York. And, likewise, all
things in regard to performance were to be done outside of Texas.
Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any
purpose, except by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact
that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas is without signifi-
cance. At all times here material, he was physically present and
acting in Mexico. Texas was, therefore, without power to affect
the terms of contracts so made.[931 Its attempt to impose a greater
obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of
the imposed obligation violates the guarantee against deprivation of
property without due process of law.9
The New York courts would predictably counter that the rule of
Home Insurance Co. should be restricted to contract cases where the
reasonable expectations of the parties and predictability of results are
paramount considerations. However, to say that the insured plaintiff
in Home Insurance Co. had any expectations whatsoever with respect
to the policy's adhesion clause for time limitation would be quite as fic-
titious as any expectations of the parties contemporaneous with a negli-
gent tort.
Whether such tenuous foundations for legislative jurisdiction will
withstand examination through the revealing lens of due process is
open to serious question. With the expansion of legislative jurisdiction
in New York, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly have the opportun-
ity to deal witht the issue.
B. Equal Protection
The Miller and Tjepkema decisions also raise disturbing questions
about judicial discrimination between plaintiffs of different residential
backgrounds; such discrimination would seem to violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the Federal Constitution. For example, in the
Tiepkema95 situation suppose the defendant had killed not only the New
Yorker but also two Missouri residents, A and B. The families of A
and B also lived in Missouri at the time of the accident, but thereafter
A's family moved to New York while B's remained in Missouri. Sup-
93. In Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1938), the late Learned
Hand, who was a pioneer in rejecting the old place of wrong rule, stated: "[It is
basic . . . that legislative jurisdiction . . . is territorial, and that no state can create
personal obligations against those who are neither physically present within its bounda-
ries, nor resident there, nor bound to it by allegiance."
So also Thomas Aquinas in his treatise on human law said, "[Tlhe subjects of
one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of another city or
kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority." SUMMA, pt. I, 2d pt., question
96, art. 5.
94. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (emphasis added).
95. Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969).
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pose also the defendant had no substantial assets from which he could
satisfy any judgments taken against him except his insurance policy
which provided maximum public liability protection of $100,000. When
the New Yorker's survivors sought to preempt the insurance proceeds
by garnisheeing the insurer's obligation, A's and B's survivors also filed
suit there. New York would have become a forum conveniens for all
three suits since the satisfaction of their respective claims would en-
tail a marshaling of defendant's assets-by interpleader or otherwise-
in order to effect an apportionment of the insurance proceeds among the
claimants.96 Finally, assume that the defendant made a general ap-
pearance in the New York court, thus avoiding any question of jurisdic-
tion under the Seider rule raised by Judge Friendly's opinion in Mini-
chello v. Rosenberg.97
Assuming that each plaintiff can prove actual damages of $100,
000, what rule of damages would the New York court apply to the re-
spective claims and how would it apportion the insurance proceeds
among the claims? Under Miller $100,000 full damages would be
awarded on the first claim. The New York court would have open at
least three alternate choices of law with respect to the two other
claims. First it could apply Missouri law and limit the recovery on
the respective claims for A and B to $25,000 each. Or second, the court
could include the claimants for A's death under New York's imperial
mantle of protection since such claimants have become residents of that
state before filing suit. Such solution would be consistent with Judge
Keating's handling of the defendants' post-accident change of residence
in the Miller case.98 This result would open the door to contrived
forum shopping but in view of New York's parochial favoritism for
its own residents perhaps ill-favored non-residents should be permitted
some forum shopping for the purpose of avoiding unjust discrimination.
If this second method were adopted, $100,000 would be awarded on
each of the first two claims but only $25,000 on the claim for B. The
court's third alternative would be to apply New York law to all three
claims, thus allowing a $100,000 judgment on each claim. It is clear
of course, that the method of apportionment of the proceeds will de-
pend on the rule of damages applied to the claims. If the apportion-
ment were made on a strictly pro-rata basis, under the first method the
96. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
97. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See notes 76-78
& accompanying text supra.
98. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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claimants for the New York decedent would get $66,666 of the insur-
ance money while the claimants for A and B would get only $16,666
each. Under the second method the first two claims would get ap-
proximately $44,444 while the claimants for B would receive $11,111.
Under the third method the claims would be treated equally and each
group of claimants would receive $33,333 of the insurance.
The results reached under either of the first two methods certainly
smack of invidious discrimination when New York's sole contact with
the underlying cause of action is the residency of the favored claimants
within its boundaries. Possibly the New York courts might try to avoid
the worst aspects of this discrimination under the first two methods by
apportioning the insurance proceeds in the first instance on the basis of
the full amount of damages suffered by the respective claimants. Then,
theorizing that Missouri law only limits the amount of such damages
which can be collected, the court could divide the money equally three
ways until the Missouri-based claimants had received the maximum
permitted by their law, leaving the balance to the New York-based
claimants. Thus, under the first method, $25,000 would be paid on
the claims for A and B, respectively, while the New Yorker's surviving
family would receive the balance of $50,000; under the second
method, $25,000 would be paid on the claim for B and the balance
would be divided equally between the first two claims, namely $37,500
for each.
There remains the tantalizing possibility that the New York courts
may be approaching the point where they will adopt the third method
suggested above: namely, they will apply New York law in all tort
claims without regard to the residence of either party or the place where
the tort occurs. It is at least arguable that the New York cases are head-
ing in this direction. For example, under its Miller rationale the New
York Court of Appeals has dispensed with the defendant's residence
as a factor prerequisite to New York's legislative jurisdiction. The 1969
decision in Tooker v. Lopez99 served to clarify the New York court's po-
sition. The essential facts here resembled those in Babcock v. Jack-
son00 except for the additional fact that a second victim was injured who
lived in Michigan where the accident occurred. The New York suit in-
volved only the claim for the New Yorker's wrongful death. The dis-
sent, however, commented on the anomaly or inconsistency of allowing
recovery for the New Yorker under New York law while the Michigan
99. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
100. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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passenger injured under identical circumstances would be barred from
recovery by Michigan's guest statute.10' Replying to this objection
Judge Keating, writing the majority opinion 1 year after his Miller opin-
ion, said:
Applying the choice-of-law rule which we have adopted, it is not
an "implicit consequence" that the Michigan passenger along with
Miss Lopez should be denied recovery. Under the reasoning
adopted here, it is not at all clear that Michigan law would gov-
ern. (Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 224 [D.C. Cir. 1968]).1021
We do not, however, find it necessary or desirable to conclusively
resolve a question which is not now before us.1
0 3
It will indeed be a surprising development if, following Judge Keat-
ing's suggestion, New York should ever impose higher standards of
care or greater liability on its own residents than would be imposed by the
law of Michigan where the injuries were inflicted and the injured passen-
ger resided. At least such a course would dissipate the suspicions of
partiality and invidious discrimination which are engendered by the
Miller and Tjepkema decisions. It seems too much to expect that New
York would adopt a choice-of-law rule which actually discriminated
against its own residents. It is more probable that if the New York court
moves further in that direction it will go the whole way and will apply its
preferred New York law in every tort action whenever it chooses, without
regard to the residence of either party or the place of tort. This
solution will presumably eliminate any question of invidious discrimina-
tion or equal protection. On the other hand it will magnify the
problem of "due process" if the court attempts to exercise legislative
jurisdiction to redefine the rights and liabilities of parties with whom
it has no connection and in respect to events or transactions wholly un-
related to New York. New York would then be following the old
rule of Machado v. Fontes,'0° recently repudiated by the English courts.
The Contrary Trend in England
It is enlightening to compare recent developments in the English
courts with those in New York. Under Phillips v. Eyre, 05 as interpreted
101. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.401 (1967).
102. Gaither v. Myers is poor support for Judge Keating's implied position since
it involved admonitory legislation imposing liability for a car thief's torts on a car
owner who had expedited the theft by leaving keys in the car. The District of Colum-
bia's legislative jurisdiction could scarcely be questioned since the defendant's penalized
conduct occurred within the District.
103. 24 N.Y.2d at 580, 249 N.E.2d at 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
104. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
105. L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870). In Phillips the plaintiff brought an action for assault
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and applied in Machado v. Fontes,10 6 the rule was long established in
England (though seldom applied and at times subject to criticism and
attack) that its courts would apply English law to substantive aspects of
a foreign tort even when both parties were foreign citizens and resi-
dents of the foreign locus delicti. Just at the time when the New York
courts seem to be approaching close to that view in Miller and Tjepkema
(although still limited to situations where at least the plaintiff is a local
resident), England has beaten a retreat in recent decisions by the
Court of Appeals and by the House of Lords in the case of Chaplin v.
Boys. 10 7
The facts in Chaplin v. Boys were relatively simple. In a road ac-
cident between two Englishmen while both were on duty with H. M.
Armed Forces in Malta, the plaintiff was seriously and permanently in-
jured. Nevertheless he suffered no economic loss since during hospi-
talization and treatment he was retained in the armed forces and his
pay and expenses were paid. Upon his disability discharge in England
he almost immediately went into private employment at higher pay. Be-
cause he suffered no pecuniary damages, under Maltese law he would
have been entitled only to £ 53 special damages.108 When the plaintiff
sued in the English court, the trial judge invoked the authority of Mach-
and false imprisonment against the Governor of Jamaica who, during a period of martial
law, had ordered the plaintiff to be arrested, placed on a ship and taken away. The
defense was that a legislative act, passed subsequent to the insurrection, retroactively
conferred immunity for liability upon the governor for the exercise of his authority in
the suppression of the rebellion. The court held that this defense was good, rejecting
the plaintiff's contention that the act could not have any extraterritorial effect. The
court then went on to say that a suit for a wrong committed abroad could be brought
in an English court only if the following two conditions were met: "First, the wrong
must be of such a character that it would have been actionable if committed in Eng-
land.. .. Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place
where it was done." Id. at 28-29. These two conditions constitute the "rule" of
Phillips v. Eyre.
106. [18971 2 Q.B. 231. In Machado the plaintiff, apparently not domiciled in
England, brought an action for libel against another non-English Domiciliary. Al-
though the libel was published in Brazil, where an action for libel would not lie, the
court held that the defendant's conduct was actionable in England. The court, relying
on Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870), applied the following test to the case at bar:
"[WIhere the words have been published outside the jurisdiction, then, in order to main-
tain an action here on the ground of a tort committed outside the jurisdiction, the act
complained of must be wrongful . . . both by the law of this country, and also by
the law of the country where it was committed.. . " [1897] 2 Q.B. at 233. Al-
though the defendant would not have been civilly liable in Brazil, he would have been
subject to criminal sanctions. The court was therefore of the opinion the act was
"wrongful' under the above criterion.
107. [1969] 3 W.LR. 322 (H.L.), afj'g [1968] 2 Q.B. 1 (C.A.).
108. Boys v. Chaplin [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, 20 (C.A.).
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ado v. Fontes'019 to apply the English law to award him £ 2,250 general
damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities (in addition to the
£ 53 special damages). The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's
appeal by 2-1 vote 10 and the House of Lord's dismissed the further
appeal by unanimous agreement."'
Dismissal of the appeals and affirmance of the trial court's award
of general damages under English law were unmistakably indicated so
long as the authority of Machado was upheld. In fact, however, a
majority of judges who sat on the case in the Court of Appeals and in the
House of Lords explicitly disapproved of the Machado decision. Yet,
with the exception of Lord Diplock on the Court of Appeals, who was
the sole dissenter, all finally reached the same conclusion that the appeals
should be dismissed in view of the fact that bath parties were English-
men normally resident in England. In so doing they followed diverse
routes of reasoning.
On the Court of Appeals Lord Denning adopted the new American
approach of seeking "the proper law of the tort," i.e., the law of the
country with which the parties and the act have the most significant
connection."' Before doing so, however, he indicated clearly that Ma-
chado v. Fontes"'. was not binding on the court:
Test it in this way: Suppose that in the present case the parties in-
volved in the accident had all been Maltese citizens, ordinarily resi-
dent in Malta. The injured man would naturally seek his remedy
in the courts of Malta. The cause of action and the measure of
damages would be governed by that law. [If the action were
brought in England, the] English courts would apply to the law of
Malta. The plaintiff would not get a new head of damages by the
mere fact that the defendant had happened to come to England.
114
Only Lord Upjohn approved of the Machado rule." 5 He also rejec-
ted the "proper law of the tort" test which Lord Denning had advanced:
I would reject any idea that such a principle should be introduced
in this country. There is no relevant analogy between the proper
law of the contract and a similar concept in tort, for while con-
tracting parties can choose the law by which their relationship
shall be governed, the victim of a tort cannot .... 16
Lord Upjohn was of the opinion that the law of the forum should ap-
109. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
110. Boys v. Chaplin [1968] 2 Q.B. 1 (C.A.).
111. Chaplin v. Boys [1969] 3 W.L.R. 322 (H.L.).
112. [1968] 2 Q.B. at 20.
113. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
114. [1968] 2 Q.B. at 24.
115. Id. at 26-30.
116. Id. at 32.
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ply, for "all questions of the remedy, both as to its nature and kinds or
heads of assessment of pecuniary damage, must be determined in an
English-action entirely by English principles." 11
In his dissent, Lord Diplock rejected Machado, arguing that the
strict rule of lex locus delicti should apply in this case." 8 He disre-
garded, as being irrelevant for choice of law purposes, the domicile of
the parties:
Apart from the chauvinistic dicta of Wightman, J., in Scott v.
Seymour (Lord), 1 H. & C. 219, 235, . . . it has never been sug-
gested that a British subject when he goes abroad carries with
him as an extra-territorial aura the English.. . law of tort; and any
development of our own rules of conflict of laws in the direction of
making civil liability for wrongs dependent upon the nationality
or. . . the domicile of the wrongdoer or of the victim would seem
to me to be a retrograde step in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury.119
In the House of Lords tribunal, Lord Donovan merely affirmed
the "general rule" that an English court will apply its lex fori to a
foreign tort in most cases.' s0 He expressly disapproved of Machado v.
Fontes, however: "It is enough to say that the case in question [Ma-
chado], while within the rule, was an abuse of it; and that considera-
tions of public policy would justify a court here in rejecting any such
future case of blatant 'forum shopping.' "121
Lord Pearson, after considering several alternatives to the ex-
isting rule,122 concluded that the lex fori doctrine "has advantages of
certainty and ease of application. It enables the English courts to give
judgment according to their own ideas of justice.' 23 He recognized,
however, that such a rule encouraged forum shopping. To discourage
it, "it may be desirable as a matter of public policy for the English courts
. . . to apply the law of the natural forum. . . . [fIt would prevent a
repetition of what may have happened in Machado v. Fontes."'24
Lord Hodson, although observing that the "proper law of the tort"
rule has led to uncertain results, nevertheless used that approach.12 5
He concluded that the law of England was properly applied because, al-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 43-45.
119. Id. at 44.
120. Chaplin v. Boys [1969] 3 W.L.R. 322, 335-36 (H.L.).
121. Id. at 336.
122. Id. at 349, 352-56.
123. Id. at 356.
124. Id. at 356-57 (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 333.
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though the accident occurred in Malta, the parties to the action were
English, who happened to be serving in Malta. Hodson also declared
that the plaintiff would fail if the court applied the lex locus delicti to the
substantive quesiton of the right to damages for pain and suffering, but
that "would be a just result if both parties were Maltese residents or
even if the defendant were a Maltese resident."'26
Lord Wilberforce accepted the rule enunciated in Phillips v.
Eyre.127  However, he believed that it should not be applied in all
situations; rather, it should be rejected if "clear and satisfying grounds
are shown why it should be departed from and what solution. . . should
be preferred.' 1 28  Wilberforce continued:
The tort here was committed in Malta; it is actionable in this
country. But the law of Malta denies recovery for pain and suf-
fering. Prima facie English law should do the same: if the par-
ties were both Maltese residents it ought surely to do so; if the
defendant were a Maltese resident the same result might follow.
But in a case such as the present, where neither party is a Maltese
resident or citizen, further enquiry is needed .... 129
General Comment
The New York courts are thus far alone among American courts
in applying the harsher sanctions of forum law in any factual situation
similar to Miller v. Miller"--i.e., where the defendant resides and com-
mitted the tort exclusively within another state whose law would limit
his liability. The two cases most closely analogus are readily distin-
guishable on their facts. In Reich v. Purcell,131 a wrongful death case,
the California Supreme Court invoked the law of Ohio, as the plaintiffs'
and decedents' state of residence, to grant full compensation despite the
restrictive law of Missouri where the deaths occurred. However, the
defendant in that case did not reside in Missouri but in California, the
126. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 339. Lord Wilberforce thought that Machado v. Fontes should be
repudiated because it permitted an action in England although the defendant's conduct
was not actionable in the place of the act. In short, Wilberforce equated "not
justifiable" (the second condition of Phillips v. Eyre, see note 105 supra) with "ac-
tionable." Machado, of course, gave a broader meaning to "not justifiable," to include
criminal penalties. See note 106 supra. Lord Hodson believed that Machado should
have been overruled for the same reason. [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 329. Lord Diplock,
who dissented in the court of appeals, had come to the same conclusion. [1968] 2
Q.B. 1, 44 (C.A.).
128. [1969] 3 W.L.R. at 343 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
131. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
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forum state, whose law was similar to that of Ohio. The decision,
therefore, went no further in principle than Babcock v. Jackson.3 ' Mis-
souri had as little interest in restricting recovery in a suit between resi-
dents of Ohio and California, whose laws are equally liberal, as On-
tario had in the Babcock case where the suit was between residents of the
single state of New York. The second case is Tiernan v. Westext Trans-
port, Inc., 33 a diversity action in Rhode Island, which had adopted the
Babcock rule. Despite the Massachusetts statutory limitation to re-
coverable damages 34 the court indicated it would apply Rhode Island
law to allow full compensation for the wrongful death of a Rhode Islander
in Massachusetts while riding in the car of a Delaware corporation
driven by a New Yorker, which car was struck by a tractor-trailer of a
Texas corporation driven by a Vermonter. None of the defendants had
an office in or any substantial relationship with either Massachusetts or
Rhode Island. 35 The judge said the interest in restricting the amount
of damages under its statute was limited to protection of its citizens from
large recoveries and to the deterrence of negligence on its highways. No
Massachusetts defendant was here involved and the allowance of a
larger recovery would not conflict with Massachusetts's concern in de-
terring negligence. The court did not mention, however, that none of
the defendants' domiciliary states limited damages for wrongful death.1
3 6
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court although pre-
viously committed to the Kilberg rule and by inference to the Babcock
rule,13 7 in 1970 decided Cipolla v. Shaposka38 which was directly con-
trary to the Miller decision. Here the plaintiff was a Pennsylvanian who
was injured in Delaware while riding as a guest in a car owned and in-
sured in Delaware and driven by the defendant-host who resided in Dela-
ware. Recovery would have been barred by the Delaware guest staute
but not by that of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania court applied Dela-
ware law to deny recovery, saying "it seems only fair to permit a defen-
dant to rely on his home state law when he is acting within the state."
The court also paraphrased language of Professor Cavers as follows:
132. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
133. 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969).
134. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1971).
135. 295 F. Supp. at 1264.
136. DEL. CoDn ANN. tit. 10, § 3704 (1953); N.Y. EsT., PowERs & TRUsTs LAW
§ 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967); TFX. REV. Civ. SrAT. ANN., art. 4671 (1952); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, § 1492(b) (1959).
137. See McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Griffith v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
138. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
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Inhabitants of a state should not be put in jeopardy of liability
exceeding that created by their state's laws just because a visitor
from a state offering higher protection decides to visit there. This
is, of course, a highly territorial approach, but "departures from
the territorial view of torts ought not to be lightly undertaken."' 139
Nevertheless, the court's approach in the Miller decision was at
least partially correct. As a general rule a forum court may properly in-
yoke its own law and implement its own policies with respect to any
event or transaction in the outcome of which it has a legitimate interest.
It is very doubtful that the Restatement's latest draft correctly represents
the attitude of modem courts when it formulates the "general principle"
that the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort
are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.4 ° It
is simply not true that there is always one particular state whose law
ought to govern tortious behavior, and that ideally the choice of law
should be uniform regardless of which of the interested states happens to
be the forum.' 4 '
More typical today is the result reached by the New York Appel-
late Division in Kell v. Henderson.4 whose facts were just the reverse of
those in Babcock v. Jackson.4 In Kell, an Ontario host and guest drove
into New York and there had an accident. The court did not apply the
Babcock domiciliary rule but continued to adhere to New York's ter-
ritorial rule so that the guest recovered compensation for his injuries.
Doubtlessly the New York court was influenced by its belief that the New
York rule was the better law; clearly, the result was more just than if On-
tario law, which rigidly excluded guest recovery, had been applied.
Similarly in cases involving conflicts in rules governing inter-spousal or
host-guest liability the Kentucky and Wisconsin courts,' although pre-
viously committed to the Babcock domiciliary rule in allowing their
139. Id. at 568, 267 A.2d at 856-57, paraphrasing D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF
LAW PROCESS 148-49 (1965). The quoted clause is from Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp.
40, 42 (D. Mass. 1942).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (Proposed Official
Draft 1968).
141. Carpenter, Pluralistic Legislative Jurisdiction: Plaintiff's Choice Under the
Klaxon Rule, 40 U. IND. L.J. 477 (1965).
142. 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aII'd, 26 App. Div. 595,
270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
143. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
144. Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Conklin v. Homer, 38
Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
These decisions and that in Kell are supported by a reasonable application of
Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations which are being invoked by more
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state residents to recover for out-of-state accidents, nevertheless con-
tinued to adhere to their territorial law to allow non-residents to recover
for injuries suffered locally within the forum state.
Today it would be prudent for a plaintiff's attorney to engage
in a bit of judicious forum shopping prior to commencing an ac-
tion. For example, in the unique case of Schwartz v. Schwartz'45 a
New York housewife sued her husband in an Arizona court to recover
damages arising from an Arizona auto accident, despite Arizona's inter-
spousal immunity law. If the suit had been brought in New York,
the court under Babcock would clearly have applied its own law to per-
mit recovery whereas there was no precedent to indicate what law Ari-
zona would apply. Fortunately for the plaintiff, the Arizona court de-
cided there was no conflict of interest: it disclaimed any Arizona inter-
est in the marital relationship of the parties while that state's interest in
safe driving on its highways was not adversely affected by the application
of New York law to permit recovery against the husband. 46 The court's
lack of enthusiasm for its own archaic law probably played a part in the
outcome. Had the decision gone otherwise, however, the plaintiff's
attorney would certainly have been at fault for not having counseled
the parties to sue in New York, where the choice of law would have been
foreordained under the Babcock rule.
It seems clear, however, the general rule stated above has definite
limitations beyond which a court ought not to go. The Miller court has
itself indicated that it would be "unfair" to apply forum law where a non-
resident or even a resident has patterned his conduct upon the law of the
jurisdiction in which he was acting.147  This criterion, of course, is not
particularly relevant to a negligent tort. But the rule should be qualified
further to state that a court violates traditional notions of fair play and
justice if it applies the heavier sanctions of its forum law in any situation
where the forum state does not have territorial or other traditional basis
for legislative jurisdiction over either (1) the event or transaction itself,
or (2) all the parties involved, or at least the defendant on whom the
forum law will impose the heavier burden or liability. Residence or cit-
and more courts since his initial article, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts
Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966). See Carpenter, New Trends in Conflicts Rules
Affecting Torts, 1 LOYOLA L.J. 187, 228-233 (Chicago 1970).
145. 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
146. Id. at 565, 447 P.2d at 257, applying N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATONS LAW § 3-313
(McKinney 1964).
147. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 19, 237 N.E.2d 877, 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734,
740 (1968).
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izenship may be a basis for legislative jurisdiction over any party, 148 but
not the mere temporary physical presence of the party in the state inde-
pendently of the event or transaction. The different rule for judicial jur-
isdiction has heretofore always been distinguished. '"
The ambience of law surrounding a court house square in Mis-
souri's foothills is quite different from that on Foley Square in New York
City. When a person has accidentally injured another in rural areas
there is apt to be more forbearance and moderation in claims for com-
pensation. Claims are more likely to be settled on a voluntary basis.
Public opinion does not regard with favor clients or attorneys who ag-
gressively seize upon accidental injuries as opportunities for personal
enrichment. Such public opinion is reflected in relatively moderate jury
verdicts. Statutory limitations on recoverable damages such as the Mis-
souri Wrongful Death Act' 50 remain probably because of rural influence
on legislatures. Such limitations are usually disparaged by metropolitan
lawyers as archaic or retrogressive.
Consider, for example, a Missouri farmer who has spent all his
life in the quiet rhythm of his countryside. He works there and con-
fines his travel to his home state. In some local accident he causes the
death of a stranger who, horribile dictu, turns out to be a resident of the
distant State of New York. Imagine the traumatic shock he will ex-
perience when a New York court, after the manner of the Tjepkema
court, asserts quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over him and applies New York
law to determine his liability. A writer in a recent issue of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal observed that public respect for courts and
lawyers is seriously impaired by the present state of automobile accident
148. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
149. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895). See also
Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. (E.D. Ark. 1959), which held that a state has
judicial jurisdiction over a person flying over that state in an airplane.
Regarding the distinction between legislative and judicial jurisdiction, Professor
Leflar has written: "Contacts sufficient to satisfy 'fair play and substantial justice' for
judicial jurisdiction under the due process clause will often satisfy whatever test . . .
the same constitutional clause prescribes for legislative jurisdiction. It cannot be con-
cluded, however, that identical facts automatically mark the outer limits of 'fair play
and substantial justice' for both constitutional purposes. The 'fairness' and 'justice'
which the due process clause requires depend upon the purposes and functions of the
law's operation in each specific separated context .... The questions of what law may
govern and what court may act are similar though not the same." R. LEFLAR, AMERI-
CAN CONFLICTS LAW § 56, at 122 (1968).
150. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 537.070 (Supp. 1971).
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litigation."5 He cited a Missouri survey which found that this lack of re-
spect is particularly prevalent in metrop6litan areas among laymen who
have there actually seen or participated in a trial. On the other hand the
report found that, outside of metropolitan areas, the experience of lay-
men with auto accident litigation generally improves their attitudes
toward courts and lawyers. The author suggested that this difference
resulted from the relatively minor influence of the automobile on rural
society and the consequent lack of "claims-consciousness" of small
town citizens.
In our territorially oriented society there may be said to be a gen-
eral expectation that no resident of State A, committing acts centered
exclusively in that state, will be held liable therefor under the law and
heavier sanctions of State B with which neither the actor nor his acts have
any connection. That a resident of the latter state had come into State
A and fortuitously happened to be affected by the defendant's con-
duct cannot in fairness justify State B in enforcing its heavier sanctions
against the actor whenever it can subsequently capture his person or
property. Professor Cavers, quoted in Miller in support of the proposi-
tion that the "expectations" of the parties are an obvious fiction having
little relevance to laws in conflict, made the following perceptive
observation:
[E]xpectations of the parties are not the only test of fairness to
them. In this territorially divided world, I believe we have come
to accept as fair the application of territorial law except in some
unusual situation as where the parties, the event, or the transac-
tions central to the controversy are closely linked to the law of an-
other state that is relevant to the matter in dispute.152
It would be far fetched to contend that the Miller and Tjepkema
cases presented such "unusual situations" that would justify New York's
rejection of the territorial laws of Maine and Missouri where the torts oc-
curred and where the defendants resided. The fortuitous fact that the
respective decedents happened to be New Yorkers voluntarily present
in the respective states at the time of their deaths is too tenous a con-
nection under any theory of jurisdiction heretofore accepted in this
country.
It is remarkable that the New York judges have chosen to push
to an extreme their claims for New York jurisdiction, just as the English
courts are beating a retreat. Is it because the English judges may
151. Selinger, Automobile Accident Litigation and the Bar, 56 A.B.AJ. 631, 632
(1970).
152. D. CAVERS, THE CaOICE OF LAw PRocEss 303 (1965). See also the views
and influence of Professor Cavers in the text accompanying note 139, supra.
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unconsciously be influenced by the decline of the British Empire and a
waning of their imperial spirit? What then explains the contrary di-
rection which the New York judges are taking? Do they believe the
star of New York's empire is on the ascendant? We might ask the ques-
tion once asked about Caesar: "Upon what meat doth this our Caesar
feed that he is grown so great?"'
53
153. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act I, sc. II, lines 149-50.
